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price-level targeting is its focus on the
past, we suggest that this feature may
actually be a virtue.
■ Rules versus Discretion:
Time Consistent Policy
Economists have long argued that the
best and surest way for a central bank to
do its job is to adopt a rule and stick to it.
One advantage of a rule is that it makes a
central bank’s actions more transparent.
Because a rule forces the bank to explic-
itly specify its long- and short-term
objectives, the public is less apt to misin-
terpret the bank’s actions, making infla-
tion stability easier to achieve. For
example, a central bank may make a
temporary change in policy. If the bank’s
actions aren’t transparent, the public
may interpret this as a change in the
long-term objective of the bank. Because
the reasons for the bank’s actions are not
explicit, the public’s expectations about
future inflation may have no moorings.
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Monetary policy rules help central
banks exercise the discipline neces-
sary to achieve their long-term goals.
The type of rule many banks are 
turning to these days is inflation 
targeting, which has several advan-
tages. But in following the rule, banks
usually base their actions on forecasts
of future inflation, and this can lead 
to inflation-rate instability in some
cases. A price-level target offers many
of the same benefits as an inflation
target, but because it uses past infla-
tion to guide the bank’s actions, it
avoids this vulnerability. 
Like Ulysses tied to the mast, most of
us have committed ourselves to some
extraordinary measure to overcome our
weakness in the face of temptation. 
We may put our alarm clock across the
room to ensure that we get up promptly.
Even though we know we need to get 
up at 6:00 a.m., when 6:00 rolls around
we are tempted to sleep just a “little”
more. Central banks can also gain from
commitment, which in their case means
adopting a rule that monetary policy
actions must follow. One of the earliest
and most famous proposals was Milton
Friedman’s constant-money-growth
rule. He argued that the monetary
authority should let the money supply
grow at a constant rate and ignore short-
run considerations, since attempts at 
stabilizing inflation or output would 
ultimately make matters worse. 
With the unexpected shift in money
demand in the early 1990s, Friedman’s
proposal took a beating (for a good
description of how the rule became 
ineffective after the technological inno-
vations of the 80s and 90s, see
“Canada’s Money Targeting Experi-
ment,” a 1998 Economic Commentary
by Paul Gomme). The relationship
between money and prices is no longer
as predictable as once thought. Most
policymakers now recognize that a 
constant-growth rule will not prevent
inflation from varying substantially 
over short and long time periods. 
Central banks around the world have
recently turned to another type of rule,
namely, inflation targeting.
A consensus is growing around the
world that central banks should adopt
policies that achieve low and stable rates
of inflation. Inflation targeting appeals to
policymakers as a way of directly
accomplishing those goals. Inflation tar-
geting also has the advantage of being an
easy rule to verify. People can tell if the
central bank is hitting the mark. But is
inflation targeting a good rule or might it
eventually break down like the money
growth rule? Unfortunately, some recent
research indicates that inflation-targeting
rules may have a weakness that makes
them unreliable tools for achieving sta-
ble inflation. 
A closely related rule is a price-level tar-
get, in which the central bank promises
to keep the price level within a prespeci-
fied band. Although similar, the two
rules have a fundamental difference.
Inflation targeting is forward-looking, as
its goal is to stabilize the growth rate in
prices. In contrast, price-level targeting
builds in a backward-looking element
because the target is the level of prices. 
This Economic Commentary first out-
lines the advantages of adopting a mone-
tary policy rule. We then examine the
benefits of having a stable inflation rate
to help understand why several central
banks have a rule that promises to stabi-
lize inflation. While there are some clear
benefits to adopting an inflation target,
we conclude that inflation targeting may
be destabilizing. We suggest that price-
level targeting can avoid this potential
pitfall and still allow many of the bene-
fits normally associated with inflation
targeting. While a common criticism ofBut another, more sinister problem with
discretion is that a central bank’s short-
term objectives may be inconsistent with
its long-term objectives, preventing a
bank from realizing its long-run goals. A
rule prevents a central bank from under-
mining its long-range goals for short-
term results. This advantage of rules
arises because of what economists often
call the dynamic inconsistency problem. 
An example can help clarify this prob-
lem. A central bank may want to keep
inflation low. But a little extra inflation,
if it’s not anticipated, can bring down
unemployment. So the central bank, like
a dieter longing for one more cookie, is
sometimes tempted to fool the public by
increasing inflation to reduce unem-
ployment. While having one cookie or
two cookies a day is not necessarily 
bad, ten can quickly become disastrous. 
Similarly, if the central bank consis-
tently tries to lower the unemployment
rate, the public would understand this
tendency. The extra inflation would be
expected, and unemployment would no
longer fall. The end result would simply
be higher inflation. 
Rules are meant to avoid this tendency.
But for a rule to succeed it must be
transparent and easily verifiable so that
the public can monitor whether the 
central bank is fulfilling its promise.
One such commitment mechanism is a
low-inflation target. We examine some
of the benefits associated with inflation
targeting to help understand why this is
becoming the rule of choice among
many central banks.
■ Benefits of Inflation
Targeting
Canada, England, Sweden, and New
Zealand have all adopted explicit infla-
tion targets. Operationally, this means
that they have an objective to keep infla-
tion within some prespecified band over
a period of usually one to three years. 
Inflation targeting appeals to so many
central banks because variable inflation
is thought by many to be costly. One
cost of variable inflation is that if it is
unanticipated, it can lead to excessive
output variability. Another problem with
variable inflation is the misallocation of
resources caused by sticky prices. With
sticky prices, an increase in the money
supply will lead to an increase in the
demand for the goods of firms that don’t
raise their price relative to those that do.
The end result is that while real output
increases, resources (labor and capital)
are misallocated between firms that
adjust their prices and firms that cannot.
Eventually, these resources flow back to
where they are most valued, but adjust-
ments are costly. Once again, inflation
variability may lead to excessive vari-
ability in output. 
The presumed benefit of inflation 
targeting is clear. If prices are pre-
dictable, firms can preset their prices
without risk. Prices will be the same
tomorrow whether or not firms can
adjust their prices. Inflation targeting
thus eliminates the inefficiencies associ-
ated with sticky prices. 
■ Inflation Targeting: The 
Problem with Looking Ahead
To achieve an inflation target, central
banks base their policy changes on 
inflation projections. Without such 
forward-looking behavior, the monetary
authority would repeatedly respond to
past inflation shocks, many of which are
temporary, with no bearing on future
inflation. The Bank of Canada sums it 
up this way: “There are lags of a year to
18 months or more between monetary
policy changes and their effects on infla-
tion and the economy. A chain of events
is set in motion that affects consumer
spending, sales, production, employ-
ment, and other economic indicators.
This means that monetary policy must
always be forward-looking.”
While the benefit of looking ahead is
clear, this approach may not provide an
anchor for inflation expectations. An 
earlier Economic Commentary of ours
explains some recent research that indi-
cates an inflation target can potentially
leave money growth vulnerable to what
economists call sunspot events—extra-
neous and unpredictable events that set
into motion self-fulfilling cycles of 
inflation expectations and realized infla-
tion (see “Sunspots and Monetary 
Policy” in the recommended readings).
The term “sunspots” is a misnomer since
the events are not likely to be purely
extraneous as the name suggests, but
instead depend on some fundamental
economic variable. 
In general, sunspots can arise because
the money supply is adjusted passively
by the monetary authority. It is supplied
at whatever level is necessary to achieve
the target. That is, the money supply is
endogenous. Changes in the money 
supply can be self-fulfilling because
policy decisions depend on what the
public is expected to do, and the public,
in turn, bases its behavior on monetary
policy actions. This can lead to a well-
known problem of “infinite regress,” in
which the public’s behavior and mone-
tary policy affect each other in turn, and
there is nothing objective on which to
“pin down” either. Outcomes are deter-
mined by each side’s beliefs about what
the other side will do. 
Sunspots are endemic to a forward-
looking rule because current movements
in the money supply depend on
expected inflation, and expected infla-
tion depends on current movements 
in the money supply. Thus, an increase
in expected inflation sets in motion a
future increase in the money supply that
is ultimately inflationary. 
Because sunspots are caused by the
endogeneity of the money supply, a 
constant money growth rule as 
advocated by Milton Friedman would
eliminate the possibility of sunspot 
fluctuation. Yet, as discussed in the
introduction, this rule may leave 
inflation unnecessarily volatile.
But inflation targeting may do the same.
Inflation targeting presents central
bankers with a paradox: to prevent
prices from rising over the short term,
they must react to changes in expected
inflation. But such action may lead to
self-fulfilling cycles of expected infla-
tion, which can actually increase infla-
tion variability. 
Recent research has shown that another
way to avoid the possibility of sunspots
is for the monetary authority to change
interest rates aggressively in response to
inflation, and to base the bulk of the
response on past inflation. The problem
with a proactive agenda is that money
growth is responding to market-
determined variables. A backward-
looking interest-rate rule, however, 
commits the central bank to moving
future funds rates in response to today’s
price movements. This timing difference
mitigates the coordination problem
because the monetary authority does not
“move” until long after the public has
moved. Instead of responding to what
the public is expected to do, the mone-
tary authority is responding to what the
public has already done.■ Backward-Looking Rules:
Are they Time Consistent?
Does this guideline provide us with a
solution to the sunspot problem? On the
surface it appears to be a reasonable
candidate for a good monetary policy
rule. While it would result in more infla-
tion variability than is optimal, inflation
expectations would be pinned down.
But an inflation target that is primarily
backward-looking has a major draw-
back. It doesn’t overcome the problem
that rules are meant to correct. A central
bank may still be tempted to go for
short-term results, which undermines 
its long-term objective. The incentive to
cheat is always there because respond-
ing to yesterday’s inflation allows for
more short-term variability 
of inflation than is desired, and looking
forward “just once” comes at no cost. 
A central bank always has an incentive
to stabilize inflation changes (by look-
ing ahead) because this provides good
results today. Occasionally reacting to
only expected inflation (as in doing so
today) is not a problem and indeed is
beneficial. But here is the rub: repeated
occasional movements quickly become
systematic, and monetary policy that
systematically looks forward is prone 
to sunspots. 
Because of this, it is difficult to see how
any inflation-targeting rule could be
operationalized to guarantee that mone-
tary policy is based primarily on past
inflation. A central bank is always going
to have an incentive to cheat, while at
the same time a promise to look back-
ward and not forward in setting mone-
tary policy is not easily verifiable. 
■ Price-level Targeting:
Looking Back to a Better
Future
The problem associated with forward-
looking interest-rate rules is quite gen-
eral. To solve it, we need a rule that is
easily verifiable and naturally builds
into it a backward-looking element. A
price-level target would fill the bill.
Although the two are sometimes used
interchangeably, there is one crucial dif-
ference between an inflation target and a
price-level target. With an inflation tar-
get, past inflation misses do not affect
future policy actions. That is, there is
base drift. With a price-level target,
however, past misses must affect future
policy actions because the monetary
authority has to get the price level back
on track. To bring prices back down,
the central bank must respond to
increases in yesterday’s inflation by
increasing the funds rate today. A true
multiyear price-level target does not
have base drift. 
An example will illustrate the point.
Suppose that last year’s inflation rate is
2 percent above normal. In the case of
inflation targeting, this fact is relevant
only if it helps in predicting the coming
inflation rate. In the case of price-level
targeting, this past inflation must be bal-
anced by a central bank policy of lower-
ing the future inflation rate to keep the
price level within the target range. 
Price-level targeting necessarily builds
in a backward element that is crucial to
avoid sunspots and effectively pin down
short-term-inflation expectations and
real output. The backward element built
in by a price-level target minimizes
other problems usually associated 
with inflation targets. An Economic
Commentary by Gavin and Stockman
pointed out that the base-drift problem
with inflation targeting leads to a great
deal of uncertainty about what the price
level 5, 10, or 30 years in the future will
be. The central bank may miss its infla-
tion target by a very small percentage 
in some years, but if these misses are
not offset, they will accumulate and
may become quite large after 30 years.
Therefore, a price-level target that 
offsets these misses will reduce the
uncertainty associated with buying 
and selling long-term fixed bonds.
■ Conclusion
This Economic Commentary has
explained why inflation targeting is
attractive to many central banks. Yet
despite the attractiveness, there is a
potential problem that central banks may
eventually run into if they adopt the rule.
While inflation-targeting rules based on
forecasts may work well some of the
time, perhaps even most of the time,
they may not always work well. Because
the consequences could be severe if the
rule fails, alternatives to inflation target-
ing are worth considering.
We suggest that a price-level target 
may be better than an inflation target
because of its inherent backward-
looking feature. This may allow the
monetary authority to enjoy many of
the benefits of inflation targeting with-
out exposing inflation to potentially
destabilizing shocks.
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